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APPLICATION TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF 
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.200, amici curiae 
ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of San Diego & Imperial 
Counties, ACLU of Southern California, Avvo, California Anti-
SLAPP Project, Electronic Frontier Foundation, First Amendment 
Coalition, and Public Participation Project respectfully request 
permission to file the accompanying amici curiae brief in support of 
appellant Yelp Inc.1 
The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California 
(ACLU-NC) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan civil liberties organization 
with more than 150,000 members dedicated to the principles of 
liberty and equality embodied in both the United States and 
California Constitutions.  For more than 75 years, the ACLU-NC 
has worked to protect the free speech and due process rights of 
Californians through litigation and other advocacy. 
The American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego & Imperial 
Counties (ACLU-SDIC) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan civil liberties 
organization with approximately 16,000 members dedicated to the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms under the United 
                                         
1  No party or counsel for any party authored this brief, 
participated in its drafting, or made any monetary contributions 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of the proposed 
brief.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(c)(3).)  Amici certify that 
no person or entity other than amici and their counsel authored or 
made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation 
or submission of the proposed brief.  
 2 
States and California Constitutions.  ACLU-SDIC has regularly 
appeared in this Court and other California courts in defense of 
freedom of speech and due process. 
The American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California 
(ACLU So Cal) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan civil liberties 
organization with more than 100,000 members.  Founded by Upton 
Sinclair in 1923 after he was arrested for reading the Bill of Rights 
at a rally in support of striking workers, ACLU So Cal has regularly 
appeared as a party or amicus, or represented parties, in cases in 
this Court to advance the free speech and due process rights of 
Californians.   
Avvo is an online legal service marketplace that provides 
attorney referrals and a database of legal information, including a 
searchable collection of 10 million legal questions and answers by 
attorneys.  One of Avvo’s integral features is attorney ratings.  Its 
attorney directory includes ratings of lawyers in all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia, comprising about 97 percent of all 
registered attorneys in the United States.  Although many plaintiffs 
have filed lawsuits against Avvo based on its attorney ratings, 
courts have protected Avvo’s rating system under the First 
Amendment.  If the Court of Appeal’s decision is affirmed, Avvo 
may be exposed to new legal threats despite the protection of the 
First Amendment. 
The California Anti-SLAPP Project (CASP) is a public interest 
law firm and policy organization dedicated to fighting SLAPPs in 
California.  It also operates a website dedicated to educating the 
legal profession and the public on SLAPP issues.  CASP led the 
 3 
statewide coalition that secured the enactment and amendment of 
California’s anti-SLAPP laws, and has continued its legislative 
advocacy.  In particular, CASP co-sponsored influential legislation 
facilitating SLAPPback suits and protecting the rights of Internet 
speakers. CASP also represented the prevailing defendant in 
Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33 (Barrett), in which this 
Court reaffirmed the broad immunity conferred by 47 U.S.C. § 230 
(section 230).  The lower court’s decision here jeopardizes CASP’s 
efforts in ensuring free speech in California and on the Internet. 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a nonprofit, 
member-supported civil liberties organization with roughly 36,000 
active donors and dues-paying members nationwide, working to 
protect consumer interests, innovation, and free expression in the 
digital world.  EFF is particularly interested in the First 
Amendment rights of Internet users and views the protections 
provided by the First Amendment as vital to the promotion of a 
democratic society. 
The First Amendment Coalition (FAC) is a nonprofit advocacy 
organization based in San Rafael, California, which is dedicated to 
freedom of speech and government transparency and accountability.  
FAC’s members include news media outlets, both national and 
California-based, traditional media and digital, together with law 
firms, journalists, community activists, and ordinary citizens. 
The Public Participation Project (PPP) is a nonprofit 
organization working to pass federal anti-SLAPP legislation in 
Congress.  Its coalition of supporters currently includes numerous 
organizations and businesses, as well as prominent individuals, 
 4 
each of whom is dedicated to protecting the right of free speech and 
petition.  PPP also assists individuals and organizations working to 
pass anti-SLAPP legislation in the states.  An important part of its 
work includes educating the public regarding SLAPPs and the 
consequences of these types of destructive lawsuits.  As part of its 
nationwide educational efforts, the PPP seeks to advance generally 
the principles of free speech and petition as embodied in the First 
Amendment.  The Court of Appeal’s opinion here threatens those 
principles for the reasons expressed in the body of this amici brief.  
The accompanying amici curiae brief by ACLU-NC, ACLU-
SDIC, ACLU So Cal, Avvo, CASP, EFF, FAC, and PPP argues that 
the injunction issued against Yelp violates the First Amendment as 
an unconstitutional prior restraint, violates Yelp’s due process 
rights by enforcing an injunction against a nonparty, and violates 
section 230 by treating Yelp as the publisher of user-created 
content.  Amici believe this Court would benefit from additional 
briefing on these issues.  Accordingly, amici request that this Court 
accept and file the attached amici curiae brief. 
 
April 14, 2017 HORVITZ & LEVY LLP
JEREMY B. ROSEN
SCOTT P. DIXLER
MATTHEW C. SAMET
By: 441~±~ C
Matthew C. Samet
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA,
ACLU OF SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL
COUNTIES, ACLU OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA, AVVO, CALIFORNIA
ANTI-SLAPP PROJECT, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, FIRST
AMENDMENT COALITION, AND
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT
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AMICI CURIAE BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment generally prohibits prior restraints on 
even allegedly actionable speech because they suppress 
communication before an adequate judicial determination can be 
made that the challenged speech lacks constitutional protection.  
Due process also generally bars courts from issuing injunctions 
against nonparties to lawsuits because they have not had the 
opportunity to defend themselves.  Similarly, 47 U.S.C. § 230 
broadly immunizes interactive computer services from lawsuits 
challenging postings made by third parties using their platforms.  
Without such immunity, interactive computer services would 
effectively be required to remove any third-party content upon a 
mere claim that it is defamatory, thereby inevitably removing 
protected speech from the marketplace of ideas.  This statutory 
protection, coupled with the First Amendment and general notions 
of due process, has permitted the Internet to flourish as the greatest 
information platform in the history of our civilization.   
Here, the Court of Appeal approved a prior restraint—
specifically, an injunction ordering nonparty Yelp to remove third-
party content from its website—with only minimal substantive 
consideration, let alone a full trial on the merits to determine 
whether the challenged speech was in fact defamatory, as required 
by the First Amendment.  In doing so, the Court of Appeal ignored 
not only long-established precedent prohibiting such prior 
 7 
restraints, but also precedent barring the issuance of injunctions 
against nonparties and providing immunity to interactive computer 
services under section 230 in similar circumstances.  This error was 
particularly egregious in the context of this case, where Yelp was 
also denied the protections that are afforded by a full and complete 
trial, and the challenged judgment resulted from cursory default 
judgment procedures.  Furthermore, the injunction violated Yelp’s 
due process rights because no court made a judicial determination 
that Yelp had aided or abetted Bird.   
In short, the injunction was riddled with deficiencies, 
violating the First Amendment, due process, and section 230.  By 
allowing this improper injunction to stand, the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion opens the Internet to a new wave of litigation that 
threatens its continued existence.   
This Court should reverse the decision below and direct the 
trial court to grant Yelp’s motion to vacate the judgment.  To the 
extent the Court of Appeal properly interpreted this Court’s 
precedent in reaching its speech-restricting conclusion, such 
precedent should be overruled. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE VIOLATES THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT. 
A. Prior restraints on speech are presumptively 
unconstitutional.  
Prior restraints are “ ‘administrative and judicial orders 
forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the 
time that such communications are to occur’ ” (Alexander v. U.S. 
(1993) 509 U.S. 544, 550 [113 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441], 
emphasis omitted), or in advance of a “ ‘judicial determination that 
specific speech is defamatory’ ” (Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. 
Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1154 (Balboa Island) [“ ‘Once speech 
has judicially been found libelous . . . an injunction for restraint of 
continued publication of that same speech may be proper’ ”]).   
The First Amendment generally prohibits prior restraints on 
speech.  (Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1159.)  Prior 
restraints are “the most serious and the least tolerable infringement 
on First Amendment rights” because they carry an “immediate and 
irreversible sanction.”  (Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart (1976) 427 
U.S. 539, 559 [96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683].)  “The special vice of a 
prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed . . . before 
an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First 
Amendment.”  (Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on 
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Human Relations (1973) 413 U.S. 376, 390 [93 S.Ct. 2553, 37 
L.Ed.2d 669] (Pittsburgh Press).)   
Thus, prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional.  
(See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Davis (1994) 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 [114 S.Ct. 
912, 127 L.Ed.2d 358] [“For many years it has been clearly 
established that any prior restraint on expression comes to this 
Court with a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)]; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan 
(1963) 372 U.S. 58, 70 [83 S.Ct. 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584].)   
B. Injunctions against speech are permitted against 
parties to a lawsuit only after a full and fair trial on 
the merits and should not be permitted against 
nonparties. 
In Balboa Island, this Court recognized a limited exception to 
the general rule barring speech injunctions, holding that “following 
a trial at which it is determined that the defendant defamed the 
plaintiff, the court may issue an injunction prohibiting the 
defendant from repeating the statements determined to be 
defamatory.”  (Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1155-1156, 
emphasis added; see also id. at p. 1148 [“an injunction issued 
following a trial . . . is not a[n unconstitutional] prior restraint”]; id. 
at p. 1158 [“it is crucial to distinguish requests for preventive relief 
prior to trial and post-trial remedies to prevent repetition of 
statements judicially determined to be defamatory”]; id. at p. 1155 
[“we hold that, following a trial at which it is determined that the 
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defendant defamed the plaintiff, the court may issue an 
injunction”].)   
The opinion in Balboa Island extended no further than 
injunctions against repeating specific speech, issued after a full trial 
on the merits.2  Indeed, the cases cited by this Court in its opinion 
each involved speech “judicially determined to be unlawful” after 
such a full and complete trial.    (Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 
                                         
2  Indeed, Balboa Island departs from the traditional common 
law rule that injunctions may not be issued against defamatory 
speech, even after a trial.  (Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams  (C.D.Cal. 
2012) 879 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1089-1090 [“Indeed, injunctions against 
speech were not permissible in defamation cases under early 
English and American common law, and the [United States] 
Supreme Court has never departed  from this precedent”]; Kramer 
v. Thompson (3d Cir. 1991) 947 F.2d 666, 677 [“the maxim that 
equity will not enjoin a libel has enjoyed nearly two centuries of 
widespread acceptance at common law”].)  Numerous courts have 
denied prior restraints of defamatory speech on this basis.  (See, 
e.g., Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc. (N.D.Okla. 1993) 827 F.Supp. 
674, 681 [“The fundamental law of libel in both Oklahoma and 
Texas is that monetary damages are an adequate and appropriate 
remedy and that injunctive relief is not available”]; New Era 
Publications Intern., ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) 695 F.Supp. 1493, 1525 [“we accept as black letter that an 
injunction is not available to suppress defamatory speech”]; Demby 
v. English (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1995) 667 So.2d 350, 355 [“It is a ‘well 
established rule that equity will not enjoin either an actual or a 
threatened defamation’ ”]; Prucha v. Weiss (1964) 233 Md. 479, 484 
[197 A.2d 253, 256]  [“We agree with the prevailing concept in other 
jurisdictions that a person allegedly injured by a libelous 
publication has no right to seek injunctive relief in equity”]; Kwass 
v. Kersey (1954) 139 W.Va. 497, 511 [81 S.E.2d 237, 245] [“equity 
has no jurisdiction to enjoin publication of defamatory matter”].)  If 
this Court does not reconsider Balboa Island, it should certainly go 
no further in approving speech-restricting injunctions than the 
narrow exception recognized in Balboa Island. 
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pp. 1151-1153, citing Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown (1957) 354 U.S. 
436, 437 [77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469] [upholding state law 
prohibiting the sale of written material found obscene after “due 
trial”], Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973) 413 U.S. 49, 55 [93 
S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446] [upholding statute banning exhibition of 
obscene material only after a full adversarial proceeding and a final 
judicial determination by the state supreme court that the material 
was unprotected], Pittsburgh Press, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 390 
[holding order forbidding help-wanted advertisements in gender-
designated columns did not constitute a prior restraint on speech 
because the order would not take effect until after a final 
determination that the advertisements were unprotected].) 
Furthermore, Balboa Island’s limited authorization of speech-
restricting injunctions applies only to injunctions issued against 
parties found liable at trial (in contrast to third parties with no 
involvement in the trial proceedings).  The opinion carefully 
permitted injunctions “issued following a trial that determined that 
the defendant defamed the plaintiff that does no more than prohibit 
the defendant from repeating the defamation.”  (Balboa Island, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1148, emphases added; see also id. at pp. 
1155-1156 [injunction after trial prohibits defendant “from 
repeating the statements determined to be defamatory”].)  
Indeed, this Court explicitly “express[ed] no view regarding 
whether the scope of the injunction properly could be broader if 
people other than [defendant] purported to act on her behalf.”  
(Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1160, fn. 11.)  The Court was 
correct to not decide that post-judgment injunctions can be directed 
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to nonparties because in “cases evaluating injunctions restricting 
speech,” a “more stringent application of general First Amendment 
principles” is required.  (Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. 
(1994) 512 U.S. 753, 765 [114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593] 
(Madsen).)  Considering the general First Amendment prohibition of 
prior restraints of speech, Balboa Island should not be extended to 
justify injunctions against nonparties after a default judgment.  
C. The injunction against Yelp is an unconstitutional 
prior restraint. 
The injunction in this case ordered Yelp to “ ‘remove all 
reviews posted by [Bird] . . . and any subsequent comments’ ” posted 
by Bird because they were supposedly defamatory.  (Hassell v. Bird 
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1345 (Hassell), emphasis omitted.)  
However, these reviews were determined to be libelous at a default 
prove-up hearing, at which Bird did not appear and Yelp did not 
attend because plaintiff did not name it as a party.  (See ibid.)  Yet, 
plaintiff then delivered the default judgment to Yelp, expecting it to 
comply with the judgment.  (Id. at p. 1346.)  However, Yelp did not 
know how the court determined that the reviews were defamatory 
because Yelp was not present to assess any of the evidence or 
testimony proffered by plaintiff and unchallenged by Bird.  (See id. 
at p. 1344.)  Even today, because “a transcript of that hearing is not 
in the appellate record” (ibid.), it is still unclear to Yelp, or to any 
reviewing court, how the trial court determined the speech was 
defamatory. 
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Thus, the injunction against Yelp operates as a prior restraint 
of speech.  It mandates removal of speech before a trial on the 
merits and without a complete and full judicial determination that 
the speech is libelous.  (See Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 
1155-1156; Nunziato, The Beginning of the End of Internet Freedom 
(2014) 45 Geo. J. Int’l L. 383, 387 [“prior restraints on speech [are] 
restrictions on speech imposed prior to a judicial determination of 
the speech’s illegality” (emphasis omitted)].)  The injunction 
compels Yelp, a nonparty to the original proceeding, to remove 
speech that it had no opportunity to contest at a trial on the merits 
(see Balboa Island, at pp. 1148, 1155-1156, 1178, fn. 11), or even at 
the default judgment stage (see pp. 14-15, post).   
To the extent the injunction affects speech after its initial 
utterance, this does not change the injunction’s character as a prior 
restraint of speech.  (Nunziato, supra, 45 Geo. J. Int’l L. at p. 401 
[“prior restraints can also be imposed midstream, after initial 
circulation but sometime before a judicial determination that the 
speech is illegal has been made” (emphases added)].)  Furthermore, 
although Bird’s alleged reviews have already been posted, the act of 
removing those posts is effectively a prior restraint of the 
“perpetuation, or continuation of that practice.” (Aguilar v. Avis 
Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 140, emphasis 
added.) 
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D. A default judgment does not provide a sufficient 
factual basis to justify a speech-restricting injunction. 
In general, it “is the policy of the law to favor . . . a hearing on 
the merits.”  (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 854-855 
[“appellate courts are much more disposed to affirm an order where 
the result is to compel a trial upon the merits than they are when 
the judgment by default is allowed to stand”]; see Fasuyi v. 
Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 681, 685 (Fasuyi); Au-Yang v. 
Barton (1999) 21 Cal.4th 958, 963.)  In particular, the law “looks 
with disfavor upon a party, who, regardless of the 
merits . . . attempts to take advantage of the mistake, surprise, 
inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary” by obtaining a default 
judgment, which might have occurred in this case.  (Weitz, at p. 
855.) 
To be sure, state law permits default judgments in certain 
circumstances.  In appropriate cases, default judgments are 
necessary to prevent a defendant from “avoid[ing] responsibility for 
his actions by the irresistible expedient of ignoring the plaintiff’s 
claims.”  (Carol Gilbert, Inc. v. Haller (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 852, 
865 (Carol Gilbert).)  Default judgment procedures also “ ‘clear the 
court’s calendar and files of those cases which have no adversarial 
quality,’ ” such as those where the defendant does not respond to 
the complaint.  (Lopez v. Fancelli (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1309-
1310.)  
But default judgment procedures carry inherent risks.  To 
obtain a default judgment, a plaintiff need only prove damages at a 
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prove-up hearing, which lacks key protections provided by a full 
trial on the merits.  (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 
879, 884 (Carlsen).)  As long as the complaint’s well-pleaded 
allegations adequately state a cause of action, a plaintiff is entitled 
to default judgment if the plaintiff can prove damages.  (Los 
Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 392.)  
Otherwise, “no further proof of liability is required,” including no 
requirement to introduce evidence to support the allegations in the 
complaint.  (Carlsen, at p. 883, citing Kim v. Westmoore Partners, 
Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 281-282.)3   
Entry of default cuts off a defendant’s right to appear at a 
prove-up hearing until the default is set aside or judgment is 
rendered (see Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. 
(1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385-386), and the defendant is not 
entitled to rebut the plaintiff’s proffered claims and evidence at the 
hearing.  (See Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2005) 126 
Cal.App.4th 1294, 1303.)  Default judgment procedure thus 
“possesses the most summary, indeed perfunctory character our law 
knows.”  (Carol Gilbert, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 865.)  
                                         
3 Plaintiffs claim that at a default judgment prove-up hearing, “a 
plaintiff like Hassell who sues for defamation must still prove 
defamation.”  (ABOM 47.)  Not so.  So long as the complaint states a 
claim for defamation, plaintiff need only prove damages from the 
challenged statements.  (Carlsen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 884.)  
There are many situations where a plaintiff could suffer damage 
from a statement but not have a cognizable defamation claim 
because of the numerous constitutional and statutory requirements 
necessary to prove a defamation claim.   
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Given the risk of unfairness inherent in default judgment 
procedures, “ ‘any doubts . . . must be resolved in favor of the party 
seeking relief from default.’ ”  (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 
Cal.4th 975, 980; see Fasuyi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 685.)  
Thus, only “ ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify a court 
in setting aside the default.’ ”  (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 
Cal.3d 227, 233, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated 
in Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973.)   
This case illustrates the potential for unfairness inherent in 
default judgment procedures when they interfere with a 
constitutional right of a nonparty.  While the Court of Appeal 
merely noted that plaintiffs “served Bird by substitute service” 
(Hassell, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343), plaintiffs actually 
served someone in Oakland—when Bird lived in Los Angeles 
according to her alleged Yelp profile—and that person “told the 
process server that he had not seen Bird in months,” (OBOM 10).  
Thus, it cannot be assumed that Bird ever received service of the 
complaint; and even if she did, she had “no duty to act upon a 
defectively served summons.”  (Slaughter v. Legal Process & Courier 
Service (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1251.)  In view of this 
questionable service, it is particularly inappropriate to rely on the 
default judgment to support an injunction limiting Yelp’s 
constitutional rights. 
The lack of procedural protections in obtaining default 
judgments also casts doubt on their reliability.  (See Spector, Where 
the FCRA Meets the FDCPA: The Impact of Unfair Collection 
Practices on the Credit Report (2013) 20 Geo. J. Poverty L. & Pol’y 
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479, 507 [“Widespread reports of unfair practices and fraud in the 
procurement of those default judgments provide additional reasons 
to question their reliability”].)  For example, many defendants have 
no idea they were sued before a default judgment is entered because 
plaintiffs fraudulently serve them.  (Id. at p. 490.)  This problem, 
suitably called “sewer service,” is so widespread that New York’s 
attorney general once filed suit “to vacate thousands of default 
judgments.”  (Id. at p. 479, fn. 2, 490, internal quotation marks 
omitted; see Rivera, Suit Claims Fraud by New York Debt Collectors 
(Dec. 30, 2009) N.Y. Times <https://goo.gl/8ZAiBA>.) 
Additionally, many default judgments are not obtained 
against the proper defendant.  (See Volokh, Dozens of Suspicious 
Court Cases, with Missing Defendants, Aim at Getting Web Pages 
Taken Down or Deindexed (Oct. 10, 2011) Wash. Post 
<http://wapo.st/2dZC3nW>.)  This is especially problematic in the 
Internet context, where speakers can hide behind obscure 
usernames and multiple identities.  A plaintiff may have sued a 
defendant whom the actual speaker impersonated online, or 
purposely served the wrong defendant so the speaker with the real 
interest in litigating the case would never receive notice to appear 
in court.  Thus, it is often difficult to ascertain if an injunction is 
“issued against the actual author of the supposed defamation—or 
against a real person at all.”  (Ibid.)   
In just one of many established cases of these fraudulent 
lawsuits, a plaintiff filed a defamation complaint against an 
individual who had no record of living at the address where the 
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plaintiff allegedly served the complaint.4  Such a situation is 
notably similar to the faulty service of process in this case, which 
the plaintiff allegedly completed at a house where Bird did not live 
at the time, if ever at all.  (See Volokh, supra, Wash. Post [“the 
possibility of such shenanigans bears on the Hassell v. Bird 
litigation that is now before the California Supreme Court”].)   
The default judgment in this case illustrates why such 
judgments are treated differently from those entered after a trial on 
the merits.  Plaintiffs’ dismissal of these concerns and subsequent 
invocation of the right to petition (ABOM 48) is ironic because the 
right to a full and fair trial on the merits is equally precious, and 
plaintiffs deprived Yelp of that right by not naming it as a 
defendant in the underlying lawsuit. 
Given the instances of fraud and lack of procedural 
protections in obtaining default judgments, Balboa Island should 
not be extended beyond authorizing injunctions following full trials 
on the merits.  In particular, the presumption of unconstitutionality 
already applied to prior restraints on speech should counsel against 
interpreting Balboa Island to allow injunctions based on default 
judgments.  The Court of Appeal erred in extending Balboa Island 
                                         
4  Volokh, supra, Wash. Post (“Let’s focus for now on the suit in 
Rhode Island.  The complaint objects to an allegedly defamatory 
comment that discussed Rescue One Financial, citing two blog 
posts, one of which is about Financial Rescue.  But neither company 
sues [the proper defendant], who might well have fought back. [¶] 
Instead, a lawsuit is filed ostensibly on behalf of Bradley Smith—
the chief executive of Rescue One Financial—against one Deborah 
Garcia, who supposedly lives in Rhode Island.  As best we can tell, 
no-one by that name lives at the address given for her.”)   
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to approve such speech-restricting injunctions in situations where 
there has not been anything resembling a full and fair trial on the 
merits.   
E. The prior restraint issued here was never subjected to 
the heightened First Amendment mandated review 
procedures that are used even after a full trial. 
As a general rule, “especially sensitive procedures” are 
required when speech is at stake.  (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of 
Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 311 (Kash); United Farm Workers 
of America v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 902, 909; see also 
Carroll v. President and Com’rs of Princess Anne (1968) 393 U.S. 
175, 183-184 [89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325] (Carroll); Castro v. 
Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 675, 690 [“Where the separation 
of legitimate from illegitimate speech is concerned, the Constitution 
calls for ‘sensitive tools’ ” (quoting Speiser v. Randall (1958) 357 
U.S. 513, 525 [78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460])]; accord, Balboa 
Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1159; In re Marriage of Evilsizor & 
Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1430; California Retail 
Liquor Dealers Institute v. United Farm Workers (1976) 57 
Cal.App.3d 606, 610-611.)    
Furthermore, injunctions issued without notice when service 
beforehand could have been accomplished—like the injunction 
here—require particularly sensitive review when First Amendment 
rights are at risk.  (Kash, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 311, citing Carroll, 
supra, 393 U.S. at p. 180); Gluck v. County of Los Angeles (1979) 93 
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Cal.App.3d 121, 135 [an ordinance “violate[d] the Kash proscription 
upon ex parte orders enjoining the exercise of protected speech”].)  
In Kash, this Court invalidated an ordinance that permitted seizure 
and destruction of news racks without a prior hearing.  (Kash, at 
p. 299.)  While public commissioners eventually notified news rack 
owners of removal, the ordinance provided “absolutely no 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the seizure, either before 
or after the removal.”  (Id. at p. 306-307.)  This Court found such ex 
parte deprivations of protected speech without notice violated “both 
procedural due process and the First Amendment.”  (Id. at pp. 307, 
309 [“In the face of this fundamental constitutional defect . . . the 
ordinance cannot stand”].)   
Plaintiffs argue that Kash and Carroll do not apply here 
because “Bird’s libelous speech was adjudicated after notice and a 
hearing.” (ABOM 17, fn. 6.)  But Yelp did not appear at the hearing 
and was not a party to the case.  Because Yelp never had its day in 
court before issuance of the injunction, the Court of Appeal denied 
Yelp the procedural protections required by Kash.  Moreover, in the 
default hearing here, there was not even a full trial on the merits as 
between plaintiffs and Bird to determine whether Bird’s speech was 
actually defamatory or not.   
Additionally, the lower court failed to follow the First 
Amendment requirement that—even after a full trial on the 
merits—appellate courts must carefully “ ‘make an independent 
examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the 
judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of 
free expression.’ ”  (Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. 
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(1984) 466 U.S. 485, 499 [104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502], quoting 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 284-286 [84 
S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686] (Sullivan); see also Evans v. Evans 
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1166.)  Accordingly, an appellate 
court’s factual review of the record in First Amendment cases is de 
novo.  (Bose Corp., at p. 492; Evans, at p. 1166.)  This standard of 
review is in stark contrast to the deference that is ordinarily 
afforded to a trial court’s factual findings.  (Easley v. Cromartie 
(2001) 532 U.S. 234, 242 [121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430]; People 
ex rel. Brown v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 
1549, 1567.) 
Given this heightened review, the use of default judgment 
procedures to enforce a speech-restricting injunction (with no 
reporter’s transcript of the key hearing) hardly satisfies First 
Amendment protection.  Because even a jury’s factual findings after 
a full trial are not afforded deference on appeal when First 
Amendment rights are at stake, it is unconstitutional for such 
rights to be curtailed by a default judgment.  This Court has never 
endorsed the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the kind of 
injunction approved by Balboa Island (injunction issued after 
complete trial on merits) can be entered after a default judgment.  
And, for all of the reasons set forth above, such an injunction 
entered after a default judgment is unconstitutional.   
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II. THE INJUNCTION AGAINST YELP VIOLATES DUE 
PROCESS. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that due process 
prohibits a court from issuing an injunction against a nonparty.  
(Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. (1969) 395 U.S. 100, 
109-112 [89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129] (Zenith Radio) [“ ‘It is 
elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam 
resulting from litigation in which he is not designated as a party’ ”]; 
see also Omni Capital Intern., Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd. 
(1987) 484 U.S. 97, 104 [108 S.Ct. 404, 98 L.Ed.2d 415] [“ ‘The 
requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows . . . from 
the Due Process Clause’ ”].) 
Where First Amendment rights are at stake, courts must be 
particularly careful to ensure their orders are narrowly tailored.  
(See Carroll, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 183 [“An order issued in the area 
of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms 
that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by 
constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public 
order”].)   
Here, Yelp is in the same situation as the defendant in Zenith 
Radio.  Yelp had no control over Bird, the named defendant in the 
underlying litigation to which Yelp was a nonparty, and Yelp had no 
opportunity to participate in the underlying default judgment 
proceeding.  In fact, the due process violation is even more egregious 
here because, unlike in Zenith Radio, there was not even a full trial 
on the merits before the injunction was issued.  To the contrary, the 
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injunction followed a one-sided default judgment proceeding with no 
appearance by Bird to defend against the allegations of defamation.  
Furthermore, no court has made any judicial determination that 
Yelp acted in concert with Bird.  Accordingly, the injunction against 
Yelp violates due process. 
III. THE INJUNCTION AGAINST YELP VIOLATES TITLE 
47 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 230.   
A. The Court of Appeal improperly applied section 230 by 
treating Yelp as the publisher instead of as an 
interactive computer service. 
Congress enacted section 230 “to further First Amendment 
and e-commerce interests on the internet.”  (Batzel v. Smith (9th 
Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (Batzel).)  Courts across the 
country—including this Court—have interpreted section 230 
broadly to insulate interactive computer services from liability.  
(Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 39 [“These provisions have been 
widely and consistently interpreted to confer broad immunity”]; 
Fields v. Twitter, Inc. (N.D.Cal 2016) 200 F.Supp.3d 964, 975, citing 
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327 (Zeran).)  
These cases have extended immunity to claims seeking both 
damages and injunctive relief.  (See, e.g., Kathleen R. v. City of 
Livermore (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 697-698 (Kathleen R.) 
[rejecting argument that immunity does not apply to claims for 
declaratory and injunctive relief], citing Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and 
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Company, Inc. v. America Online Inc. (10th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3d 980, 
983-986; see also 4 Ballon, E-Commerce and Internet Law (West 
2016) Injunctive Relief and Orders Directing Interactive Computer 
Services to Remove Third Party Content, § 37.05[8].)  Congress 
itself has explicitly endorsed this line of cases as “correctly decided.”  
(Carome & Rushing, Anomaly or Trend? The Scope of § 230 
Immunity Challenged by Two Courts, Comm. Law., Spring 2004, at 
p. 3.)   
Section 230 immunizes providers or users of an interactive 
computer service, defined as “any information service . . . that 
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer 
server” (47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)), from liability “as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider” (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 330 
[“[section] 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would 
place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role”]).  There is 
no dispute that Yelp is a provider, or at the very least, a user of an 
interactive computer service.  (See Batzel, supra, 333 F.3d at p. 
1030 [“There is . . . no need here to decide whether a listserv or 
website itself fits the broad statutory definition of ‘interactive 
computer service,’ because . . . § 230(c)(1) confers immunity not just 
on ‘providers’ . . . but also on ‘users’ of such services”].)  It is likewise 
undisputed that Bird is also an information content provider 
because she is “responsible . . . for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet.”  (47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).)   
The default judgment here conflicts with section 230 because 
it would treat Yelp as a publisher by casting Yelp “in the same 
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position as the party who originally posted the offensive messages.”  
(Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 333; PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc. 
(D.S.D. 2001) 163 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1071 [“The Complaint seeks to 
treat Kinko’s as a publisher . . . . [it] seeks to place Kinko’s in 
Jimmy’s shoes, by holding Kinko’s responsible for alleged 
defamatory matter that was published by Jimmy”].)  Enforcement of 
the default judgment here would therefore conflict with section 230.  
(Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 831 (Gentry) [“If by 
imposing liability . . . we ultimately hold eBay responsible for 
content originating from other parties, we would be treating it as 
the publisher . . . contrary to Congress’s expressed intent”].)   
Congress explicitly granted immunity “to promote the 
continued development of the Internet . . . [¶] . . . [and to] preserve 
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for 
the Internet.”  (47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2); see also Batzel, supra, 333 
F.3d at pp. 1027, 1033.)  Courts and scholars have warned that 
imposing liability on providers like Yelp, however, would threaten 
to halt the growth of the Internet.  (See, e.g., Batzel, at pp. 1027-
1028; Letter from Twenty-Three Trade Associations, Civil Liberties 
and Internet Groups, and Nineteen Law Professors to Congressional 
Leaders (July 30, 2013) <http://goo.gl/539quF> (hereafter Law 
Professors Letter).) 
Plaintiffs claim it is somehow inconsistent for Yelp to argue it 
is not the publisher of Bird’s speech for the purposes of section 230, 
but to assert it has the First Amendment right to host that speech 
on its website.  (ABOM 3.)  Plaintiffs miss the point.  Yelp provides 
a forum for the free speech of others, and it has an independent 
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First Amendment interest in doing so.  (See Sullivan, supra, 376 
U.S. at pp. 257, 260 [reaffirming a newspaper’s First Amendment 
rights in political advertisement created by another agency 
published in that newspaper]; Pittsburgh Press, supra, 413 U.S. at 
p. 386 [acknowledging a newspaper’s First Amendment rights in 
help-wanted advertisements submitted by other parties].  Moreover, 
section 230 merely provides that interactive computer services 
should not be treated as publishers when information is provided by 
another information content provider.  (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).)  Thus, 
a website does not forfeit its First Amendment rights as a publisher 
by virtue of claiming immunity under section 230.   
B. Yelp’s knowledge of an improper post does not deprive 
Yelp of section 230’s protections.  
Consistent with congressional intent, this Court, in line with 
others, has broadly interpreted section 230 to reject the imposition 
of liability on interactive computer services based on the fact that 
they have notice about an allegedly improper post.  (Barrett, supra, 
40 Cal.4th at p. 54.)  Permitting liability simply based on notice 
would cause “deleterious effects” because if interactive computer 
services were liable for defamatory content upon notice of such 
content, they would be deterred from self-screening user content 
because discovering defamatory messages would increase their 
liability.  (Id. at pp. 54-55.)   
Under a regime in which notice yielded liability, parties who 
found messages they dislike would have an easy and cost-free 
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means of removing the messages simply by notifying the website, 
which would likely remove the content rather than risking costly 
litigation and potential liability.  The result would be a profound 
chilling of Internet speech.  (Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 54-55.)  
This chilling effect is not merely theoretical, but “obvious,” because 
it would be “impossible for service providers to screen each of their 
millions of postings for possible problems” and result in severe 
speech restrictions.  (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331.)  At worst, 
courts have found that chilled speech would result in “shutting 
down websites.”  (Batzel, supra, 333 F.3d at pp. 1027-1028.)   
C. Section 230 provides important protections necessary 
for a free and robust exchange of ideas on the Internet.   
Absent immunity under section 230, websites hosting third-
party content would be subject to “crushing” and “crippling” 
liability.  (Carome & Rushing, supra, Comm. Law. at pp. 3, 8.)  
Liability would be devastating because on many websites, “every 
single comment by a third-party user is automatically posted,” and 
comments can reach “into the millions.”  (French, Picking Up the 
Pieces: Finding Unity After the Communications Decency Act Section 
230 Jurisprudential Clash (2012) 72 La. L.Rev. 443, 474.)  
Therefore, heavily-trafficked providers could avoid liability only by 
creating a “comprehensive monitoring system” that would “be 
financially burdensome, unfeasible, or impossible.”  (Ibid.)   
Rather than absorbing such costs or passing them on to their 
users, interactive computer services would likely “remove any 
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system of formal notification” to avoid notice-based liability.  
(French, supra, 72 La. L.Rev. at p. 475.)  At worst, they would 
“choose instead just to remove all content that is complained about, 
without regard to its offensiveness or the resulting chilling effect on 
free speech.”  (Ibid.; see Freivogel, Does the Communications 
Decency Act Foster Indecency? (2011) 16 Comm. L. & Pol’y 17, 46 [“A 
notice-and-takedown procedure likely would result in sites taking 
down every piece of content about which a complaint is filed—
whether that content was objectionable or not”].)  Congress granted 
broad immunity to Internet companies to avoid these risks.  
Therefore, an expanded liability regime would actually 
“discourage[ ] services from setting up the self-regulatory regimes 
that Congress wanted to encourage.”  (Carome & Rushing, supra, 
Comm. Law. at p. 8.)   
Scholars have recognized that broad immunity “is the only 
interpretation of [section] 230 that protects the interests of both 
prudence and justice.”  (French, supra, 72 La. L.Rev. at p. 485; see 
Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary 
Immunity (2010) 15 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 123, 152 [“A tort system that 
imposes the costs on the person who engaged in the legal risk—the 
anonymous commenter—is the fairest method of imposing 
liability”].)  Additionally, it is the “only way” to “encourage [a] 
website to screen content fearlessly and fairly.”  (French, at p. 485).  
If interactive computer services instead removed all content upon 
notice, studies have shown that “every actual defamatory message 
that an intermediary is pressured to remove will result in between 
four to nine other, non-defamatory postings also being censored.”  
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(Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the 
Online Marketplace of Ideas (2008) 63 U. Miami L.Rev. 137, 221.)  
Because any damage to genuine defamation victims would have 
already occurred after publication, “such a large false positive rate 
is unacceptable.”  (Ibid.; see Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. 
Munson Co., Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 947, 956 [104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 
L.Ed.2d 786] [“Even where a First Amendment challenge could be 
brought by one actually engaged in protected activity, there is a 
possibility that, rather than risk punishment for his conduct in 
challenging the statute, he will refrain from engaging further in the 
protected activity.  Society as a whole then would be the loser.”].)  
Most importantly, “[b]y imposing liability on the 
intermediary, a court is harming society at large by reducing the 
amount of speech on the Internet.”  (Kosseff, supra, 15 J. Tech. L. & 
Pol’y at p. 152.)   Imposing liability “would dramatically reduce 
opportunities for free expression online,” and “many of the 
platforms that have transformed everything from entertainment 
and personal communications to democratic participation and social 
activism might not exist at all.”  (Law Professors Letter, supra, at p. 
2.)  Consequently, “there would be no online fora for Americans to 
express themselves, thus eviscerating one of the most fundamental 
rights in our country: the freedom of speech under the First 
Amendment.”  (Tischler, Free Speech Under Siege: Why the Vitality 
of Modern Free Speech Hinges on the Survival of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (2014) 24 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. 
L.Rev. 277, 278-279.) 
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D. The Court of Appeal’s decision imperils many widely 
used websites. 
Section 230’s broad immunity has been particularly 
influential on the development of websites such as “YouTube, eBay, 
Yahoo!, Verizon, Comcast, and others.”  (Lemley, Rationalizing 
Internet Safe Harbors (2007) 6 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 101, 
111.)  Absent immunity, these websites would “face the prospect of 
tens of billions of dollars in statutory damages for hosting, carrying, 
or linking to content whose provenance they cannot determine” and 
“either go out of business” or “impose restrictions on the content 
they will carry sufficiently onerous that they would effectively lock 
down the Internet.”  (Ibid.)  The Internet has flourished in part 
because courts have consistently protected these entities from 
crippling liability, but the Court of Appeal’s decision calls this body 
of law into question, opening these influential websites to lawsuits 
that could threaten their existence. 
For instance, eBay hosts third-party reviews of sellers and 
buyers, which opens up the bidding service to defamation claims.  It 
also suffers from false advertising claims based on sellers’ listing 
descriptions.  Cases such as Mazur v. eBay, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2009) 257 
F.R.D. 563, and Gentry, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 816, have recognized 
eBay is immune from such false advertising claims due to section 
230.  In particular, the Court of Appeal in Gentry reasoned that 
lawsuits against eBay and other providers based on third-party 
content would threaten freedom of speech and “ ‘the robust nature 
of Internet communication.’ ”  (Gentry, at p. 829, quoting Zeran, 
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supra, 129 F.3d at p. 330.)  Therefore, denying immunity would 
become “ ‘an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ”  (Gentry, at p. 833.)  The 
decision below would frustrate the same congressional purposes.   
Section 230 has also protected Google from liability.  Google’s 
“suggested” advertisements have not resulted in culpability due to 
section 230’s broad protection.  (Goddard v. Google, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 
2009) 640 F.Supp.2d 1193, 1197, 1202.)  Google’s “sponsored” links 
have also been immunized against plaintiffs’ attempts to “plead 
around” section 230 by claiming Google actually created user 
content.  (Jurin v. Google Inc. (E.D.Cal. 2010) 695 F.Supp.2d 1117, 
1123.)  Like Yelp’s reviews, Google’s organic search results have 
also been protected from complaints targeting allegedly defamatory 
third-party websites and Google’s decisions in removing or de-
indexing them.  (Manchanda v. Google (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 16, 2016, No. 
16-CV-3350 (JPO)) 2016 WL 6806250, at p. *3 [nonpub. opn.] 
[immunizing Google under section 230].)  However,  the decision 
below threatens these protections.  Google “has no realistic way of 
knowing which of the over 10 billion Web pages it searches” could be 
defamatory “[e]ven if it employed an army of lawyers to scrutinize 
all of the content.”  (Lemley, supra, 6 J. Telecomm. & High Tech L. 
at p. 102.) 
Courts have also protected Facebook from liability for content 
on user profiles.  (Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2016) 167 
F.Supp.3d 1056, 1066 [no responsibility for a third-party account 
because “[l]iability based on that sort of vicarious 
responsibility . . . is exactly what § 230(c) seeks to avoid”].)  When 
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courts have rejected efforts to plead around immunity against 
Facebook, they have emphasized that “ ‘what matters is whether 
the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the 
defendant as the “ ‘publisher or speaker’ ” of content provided by 
another.’ ”  (Sikhs for Justice “SFJ” Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 
2015) 144 F.Supp.3d 1088, 1094, quoting Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th 
Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1096, 1101.)  Thus, contrary to the Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning below, it is irrelevant whether a lawsuit names a 
particular website as a defendant, because ultimately the website is 
treated as a publisher if its Internet speech is enjoined.  Under such 
a liability regime, Facebook could be subjected to “ ‘costly and 
protracted legal battles’ ” (Sikhs, at p. 1096), and risk “ ‘shutting 
down’ ” (Caraccioli, at p. 1065).   
Amazon, the largest Internet retailer, has also avoided 
crippling liability because of section 230.  (Joseph v. Amazon.com, 
Inc. (W.D.Wash. 2014) 46 F.Supp.3d 1095, 1106 [“The CDA’s 
express terms preclude [Plaintiff] from treating Amazon as a 
publisher”]; Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc. (W.D.Wash 2004) 351 
F.Supp.2d 1090, 1117-1118.)   Like Yelp, Amazon allows its users to 
post reviews, which makes it a target for defamation actions.  But 
courts have “repeatedly barred similar claims against countless 
websites that allow anonymous reviews or other allegedly 
defamatory content to be posted by third parties,” and this case is 
no different.  (Joseph, at p. 1106.)  If the decision below were 
extended to Amazon, Amazon would have no incentive to self-
regulate its customer reviews to find fake posts since it would be 
easier and more cost-effective to simply remove messages upon any 
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allegation of defamation.  (See Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc. 
(Ct.App. 2001) 108 Wash.App. 454, 463 [“Congress intended to 
encourage self-regulation, and immunity is the form of that 
encouragement” (footnote omitted)].)   
Likewise, the effect of imposing liability on Twitter would be 
“untenable.”  (Lee, Subverting the Communications Decency Act: 
J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings (2016) 7 Cal. L.Rev. Circuit 11, 
18.)  Since takedown requests can “span [an] entire range of daily 
tweets,” which can number 500 million, Twitter might instead 
overregulate its users’ speech to avoid liability for such a 
voluminous number of posts.  (Ibid.)   
Avvo, one of the preeminent websites for attorney ratings, has 
also avoided liability for its rating system due to the prospect of 
section 230 immunity.  (King, Amicus Letter of Avvo, Inc. to Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Associate Justices of the California 
Supreme Court, Aug. 10, 2016, p. 1 [“The fact that none of these 
cases have made it past the pleadings . . . is due in large measure to 
what we call ‘the law that makes the internet go:’ 47 U.S.C. § 230”].)  
Similarly, Avvo’s rating system has been protected by the First 
Amendment.  (Browne v. Avvo Inc. (W.D.Wash. 2007) 525 F.Supp.2d 
1249, 1251-1253 [not reaching the issue of immunity under section 
230 because plaintiffs disavowed all claims based on third-party 
content].)  However, the Court of Appeal’s decision threatens Avvo’s 
success in this regard, introducing the possibility that courts will 
not entertain section 230 immunity at all.  Furthermore, “[i]n the 
absence of this immunity, [Avvo] would likely need to have rigidly 
open forums—to avoid allegations of abuse of some standard of 
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care—or simply stop providing the public with a resource in which 
people could read and post about experiences with legal 
representation.”  (Avvo Amicus Letter, at p. 2.) 
Furthermore, section 230 protects smaller startups and 
entities such as public libraries that integrate third-party content. 
(See Kathleen R., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 691-692 [protecting a 
public library from liability for unrestricted access to the Internet].)  
Without immunity, these smaller yet equally important entities are 
even more likely to restrict user content in order to avoid liability 
because of their limited financial resources to defend themselves in 
litigation.  (See Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331.)  The Court of 
Appeal’s opinion, if affirmed, would have devastating consequences 
for these smaller entities, at significant cost to the overall 
marketplace of ideas.   
By enforcing an injunction against Yelp, the Court of Appeal 
inadequately considered the catastrophic impact on the Internet 
that could result.  It has treated Plaintiffs’ claim inconsistently from 
all other judgment enforcement actions against interactive 
computer services simply because Plaintiffs never named the 
Internet provider as a defendant in the underlying defamation suit.  
If affirmed, the Court of Appeal’s decision will undoubtedly “lead[ ] 
to litigation abuses by plaintiffs who seek to recast claims subject to 
significant immunity as different types of claims with lesser or 
nonexistent immunity.”  (Lemley, supra, 6 J. Telecomm. & High 
Tech. L. at p. 108.)  Plaintiffs dismiss these effects as a “sky-is-
falling” argument (ABOM 46), but ignore the fact that the immunity 
they seek to override is precisely why the sky has not fallen and the
Internet has flourished.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the
decision below and direct the trial court to grant Yelp’s motion to
vacate the judgment.
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